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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Fifty-five-year-old Mark Howard Pendleton was charged with felony possession 
of a controlled substance – methamphetamine, unlawful possession of a firearm, and a 
persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  Mr. Pendleton filed a motion to suppress, 
which the district court denied after determining Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to 
challenge the search of the building where the methamphetamine and firearm at issue 
had been found.  Following a jury trial, the jury found Mr. Pendleton guilty of possession 
of a controlled substance – methamphetamine.  Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Pendleton then agreed to plead guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and admit 
to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.   
On appeal, Mr. Pendleton asserts the district court erred when it determined he 
did not have standing to challenge the search of the building. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 The State filed a Criminal Complaint alleging Mr. Pendleton committed one count 
of felony drug-trafficking in cocaine or a mixture of (28 grams or more but less than 200 
grams), one count of felony possession of a controlled substance, and one count of 
felony unlawful possession of a firearm.  (R., pp.25-26.)1 
 At Mr. Pendleton’s preliminary hearing, Detective Paul Egbert with the Idaho 
State Police testified that he and other officers assisted two Idaho Department of 
Correction parole officers with the search of the upstairs of the building located at 187 
                                            
1 All citations to the Clerk’s Record on Appeal refer to the pagination from the 352-page 
PDF electronic version of the record. 
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First Street in Idaho Falls.  (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.3, L.25 – p.4, L.5, p.5, L.11 – p.8, 
L.24; R., p.27.)  Detective Egbert testified the parole officers had called for assistance 
with a “home search” at the residence of Mr. Pendleton.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.5, Ls.11-
16, p.6, L.2 – p.8, L.20.)  Mr. Pendleton had been on felony parole in Bonneville County 
No. CR 2009-1613.  (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.9, L.4 – p.11, L.14, p.42, Ls.6-16.)   
The building had been used for commercial purposes off and on, and the 
downstairs was under renovation at the time of the search.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.13, 
Ls.1-3.)  Detective Egbert described the upstairs of the building as an apartment with 
two rooms used as bedrooms.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.13, Ls.3-18.)  Mr. Pendleton, an 
adult female, and two minor females were upstairs.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.7, Ls.19-21.)    
Detective Egbert testified that when he arrived upstairs, the parole officers 
directed him to a pellet rifle in the living room.  (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.8, Ls.9-16, 
p.12, Ls.11-15, p.15, Ls.2-6.)  He and the other officers began searching for 
contraband.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.8, Ls.23-24.)  Mr. Pendleton’s daughter, one of the 
minor females present, stated one of the bedrooms was hers.  (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, 
p.13, Ls.22-24.)  The detective testified the other bedroom was Mr. Pendleton’s 
bedroom.  (See Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.14, Ls.15-17.)  Detective Egbert asked 
Mr. Pendleton for the key to the locked closet in that room.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.20, 
L.25 – p.21, Ls.10.)  According to Detective Egbert, Mr. Pendleton made several 
different statements regarding the closet and key, eventually stating the key was locked 
inside the closet on a keychain with a small tape measure attached to it.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 
2014, p.21, Ls.11-19.)  Detective Egbert had the closet door breached, and found inside 
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the closet a key in a black lockbox on a keychain with a small tape measure attached.  
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.21, L.20 – p.22, L.11.) 
Detective Egbert testified there was men’s clothing in the dressers and closet in 
the bedroom.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.14, Ls.2-3.)   There was also a .22 caliber pistol in 
the closet.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.15, Ls.7-20.)  The detective further testified suspected 
methamphetamine and suspected cocaine were in the closet.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.15, 
L.24 – p.16, L.25, p.17, L.24 – p.18, L.23.)  The substances tested presumptively 
positive, respectively, for methamphetamine and cocaine.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.17, 
Ls.5-10, p.18, L.24 – p.19, L.3.)  Additionally, Mr. Pendleton’s prescription pill bottles 
were in the closet.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.17, Ls.11-15, see Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.31, 
Ls.3-6.)   
On cross-examination, Detective Egbert testified that one of the parole officers 
had told him the bedroom was Mr. Pendleton’s.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.36, Ls.11-17.)  
Work coveralls were hanging in the closet, and Mr. Pendleton had told the detective he 
was working for the owner of the building doing construction work downstairs.  
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.37, Ls.10-19.)  The storage area was full of “construction type 
stuff.”  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.37, Ls.21-22.) 
In its argument, the State emphasized the bedroom with the closet appeared to 
be a male’s room.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.48, Ls.15-23.)  The State then argued “there is 
a certain control and possessory ownership over these things that were [found] inside of 
that closet.  So we’re going to ask the Court to bind the defendant over based on that.”  
(Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.49, Ls.19-23.)  Based on Detective Egbert’s testimony, the 
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magistrate found probable cause and bound Mr. Pendleton over to the district court on 
each count.  (Tr., Aug. 13, 2014, p.50, L.6 – p.51, Ls.11-15.)   
The State then charged Mr. Pendleton by Prosecuting Attorney’s Information with 
drug-trafficking in cocaine (28 grams or more but less than 200 grams), possession of a 
controlled substance – methamphetamine, and unlawful possession of a firearm.  
(R., pp.36-37.)  The State later moved to dismiss the drug-trafficking in cocaine count 
because the lab results indicated the substance at issue for that count was lidocaine, 
not cocaine.  (See R., pp.70-71, 86-87; Tr., Jan. 26, 2015, p.17, Ls.6-9.)  The State 
amended the information to move forward with the possession of a controlled substance 
– methamphetamine and unlawful possession of a firearm counts.  (See R., pp.83-85.) 
Mr. Pendleton filed a Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence, under the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  (R., pp.39-41.)  The motion to 
suppress asserted the officers had no warrant or legal cause to search Mr. Pendleton, 
because the officers had no articulable facts to support probable cause for a search 
warrant and an exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to the circumstances.  
(R., pp.39-40.)  After the district court allowed Mr. Pendleton’s counsel to withdraw 
(R., p.58), Mr. Pendleton filed, pro se, additional motions to suppress containing 
substantively the same arguments.  (R., pp.72-74, 94-96.)2 
At the motion to suppress hearing, the State argued it would “not agree that 
[Mr. Pendleton] has standing to go forward until he establishes where he was residing 
and that, in fact, he was residing at that residence. . . .  If he won’t do that, then he has 
                                            
2 Mr. Pendleton had entered guilty pleas to the two charges under a binding plea 
agreement (R., pp.89-90), but the district court later granted his motion to withdraw the 
guilty pleas.  (R., pp.92-93, 195-96.) 
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no standing.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.46, Ls.7-15.)  On the “standing” issue, 
Mr. Pendleton testified he was employed by one Mr. Corona, the owner of the building 
at 187 First Street, and admitted his check stubs from Mr. Corona’s business into 
evidence.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.52, L.11 – p.53, L.12; see Def. Ex. A, Feb. 19, 2015.)  
Mr. Pendleton did not reside at the building, but he worked there to clean the outside 
and had his tools there.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.6-9.)  He further testified, “I had 
certain responsibility to secure the building.  I had access to the tools which were there 
at the building to perform my job.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.18-20.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Pendleton testified he had never lived permanently at 
the building, and had not resided or slept at the building for three months.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 
2015, p.55, Ls.7-16, p.56, Ls.12-21.)  Mr. Pendleton had been living at his cousin’s 
residence at a different address.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.55, L.16 – p.56, L.5.) 
The State contended Mr. Pendleton “has definitively shown this Court he does 
not reside at that location.  And if he doesn’t reside at that location, he has no 
reasonable expectation of privacy at that location.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.5-8.)  
The State further argued Mr. Pendleton indicated he was not an overnight guest, and he 
could not “claim a privacy interest in a location in which he is not residing or an 
overnight guest.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.58, Ls.9-13.)  The State argued Mr. Pendleton 
“can’t go forward with a motion to suppress if he has no privacy interest.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 
2015, p.58, Ls.18-19.) 
In response, Mr. Pendleton asserted there is an “expectance of privacy when you 
work for a certain individual depending on the type of job that you do.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 
2015, p.59, Ls.3-5.)  He asserted he was the foreman when his boss was not present, 
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and therefore was in control of his work area and had to uphold the wishes of the owner 
to allow “no trespassing by anybody.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.6-10.)  
Mr. Pendleton and his boss expected privacy so that Mr. Pendleton would not be 
harassed and could perform his job without being interrupted.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, 
Ls.11-16.)  Mr. Pendleton asserted, “I do expect a large amount of privacy based on 
that.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.17-18.) 
 In rebuttal, the State argued, “I’m not aware of any case law that says that you 
have an expectation of privacy at the workplace.”  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.21-23.)  
The State contended that if Mr. Pendleton “is not going to admit that he resides at that—
resided at that location, he has no standing to bring this motion to suppress.”  
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.4-6.) 
 The district court, based on Mr. Pendleton’s testimony, found that Mr. Pendleton 
was employed by Mr. Corona at 187 First Street.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.11-18.)  
The district court heard testimony that Mr. Pendleton had a job and certain 
responsibilities associated with that job.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, Ls.23-25.)  The 
district court accepted the checks written to Mr. Pendleton (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, 
Ls.19-22), and also accepted his testimony that,  
he does not reside at this residence; that he did work at this location; that 
he has some responsibilities, which—clean out the building, has 
responsibility to secure the building; that he never permanently resided 
there; that he hadn’t lived there for three months; but that at the time that 
is in question, he was sleeping at a separate residence . . . at a cousin’s 
residence; and he definitely states that he has not resided and does not 
reside at this residence of Mr. Corona. 
 
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.60, L.11 – p.61, L.10.) 
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 Addressing Mr. Pendleton, the district court determined it could not “make a 
finding that [the items found at the building] should be suppressed without some initial 
standing.  And if you’re claiming today that this is not your place of residence, then the 
Court simply, as [the State] correctly pointed out, cannot proceed any further.”  
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.)  The district court also told Mr. Pendleton, “what 
you are asking this Court to do, which I am unable to do based upon the testimony I’ve 
heard today, is to make a specific finding based upon constitutional protections that 
these matters should be suppressed under the authority.”   (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, 
Ls.1-5.) 
 As to whether an employee has some expectation of privacy at a workplace, the 
district court stated:  
I’m confident that there is some authority that relates to that.  I have 
in my own mind my own understanding as to how far that authority will go, 
but I can say very clearly today that, based upon the testimony that the 
Court has heard today, the Court can make no finding that there was any 
expectation of privacy established by you based upon your 
assertions today. 
 
(Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.6-15.)  Thus, the district court denied the motion to 
suppress.  (Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.62, Ls.16-17.) 
 After the denial of the motion to suppress, the State amended the information a 
second time to include a Part II charging Mr. Pendleton with a persistent violator 
sentencing enhancement pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514.  (R., pp.213-16.) 
The case proceeded to a jury trial on the possession of a controlled substance – 
methamphetamine count, where the parole officers, Detective Egbert, and other Idaho 
State Police officers testified on behalf of the State.  (R., pp.293-99.)  The owner of the 
building, Ruben Corona, was also called as a State’s witness under a subpoena.  (Trial 
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Tr., Vol. I, p.172, Ls.16-21, p.174, Ls.10-16.)  Mr. Corona testified he had hired 
Mr. Pendleton to do construction work at the building (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.174, Ls.17-19), 
and later allowed Mr. Pendleton to move into the upstairs apartment.  (Trial Tr., Vol. I, 
p.175, L.19 – p.176, L.14.)  Mr. Pendleton’s daughter testified for the defense that she 
and Mr. Pendleton never lived at the building.  (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, pp.97-99.)3 
During the State’s closing argument, the State contended Mr. Pendleton was in 
possession of the methamphetamine because he lived at the building:  “If this was just a 
job site, why were his old pill bottles there . . . .  Why would anyone keep personal items 
like that at just a job site?”  (See Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.156 – p.160.)  Later in rebuttal, the 
State argued the issue was whether or not Mr. Pendleton “possessed 
methamphetamine.  And it was his house, that he said he lived in, and his bedroom, 
and his daughter stayed there, too.”  (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.171 – p.172.) 
The jury found Mr. Pendleton guilty of possession of a controlled substance—
methamphetamine.  (R., pp.300, 303.)  Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, 
Mr. Pendleton then agreed to plead guilty to the unlawful possession of a firearm charge 
and admit to the persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (See R., pp.300-01.) 
For possession of a controlled substance – methamphetamine, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.327-28.)  For 
unlawful possession of a firearm, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five 
years, with three years fixed.  (R., p.328.)  The sentences were to be served 
concurrently.  (R., p.328.) 
                                            
3 About half of Volume II of the Trial Transcript does not contain line numbers. 
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Mr. Pendleton filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment of 
Conviction.  (R., pp.332-336.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it determined Mr. Pendleton did not have standing to 




The District Court Erred When It Determined Mr. Pendleton Did Not Have Standing To 





 Mr. Pendleton asserts the district court erred when it determined he did not have 
standing to challenge the search of the building.  The district court determined 
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of 
residence.  (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18.)  Contrary to the district court’s 
determination, one may have standing to challenge the search of one’s workplace.  
Here, Mr. Pendleton had standing to challenge the search because he had a subjective 
expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is willing to recognize 
as reasonable. 
 
B. Standard Of Review And Applicable Law 
 
The standard of review for a motion to suppress is bifurcated.  An appellate court 
defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous, and 
freely reviews the trial court’s application of constitutional principles to the facts as 
found.  State v. Hankey, 134 Idaho 844, 846 (2000). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that “[s]tanding is an issue over which this 
court exercises free review.”  State v. Doe, 148 Idaho 919, 936 (2010).  “The issue of 
whether a party has standing to assert a particular claim should be resolved before the 
merits of the claim are reached.”  Id. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable 
searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  “This guarantee has been incorporated 
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through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states.”  
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).  “Evidence obtained in violation of the 
amendment generally may not be used as evidence against the victim of the illegal 
government action.”  Id. at 810-11.  “This rule, known as the exclusionary rule, applies 
to evidence obtained directly from the illegal government action and to evidence 
discovered through the exploitation of the original illegality, or the fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”  Id. at 811.   
“Any warrantless search or seizure of a citizen is presumptively unreasonable 
unless if falls within certain specific and well-delineated exceptions.”  Halen v. State, 
136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002).  “When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the 
defendant, the State bears the burden to show that a recognized exception to the 
warrant requirement is applicable.”  Id. 
However, “[a] person challenging a search has the burden of showing that he or 
she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place searched.”  State v. 
Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626 (2008) (citing Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 
(1980); State v. Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 651 (1983)).  “That involves a two-part inquiry: 
(1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the 
challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as 
reasonable?”  Id. (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); State v. Donato, 
135 Idaho 469, 473 (2001)).  As shorthand for this inquiry, courts often refer to whether 
a defendant has “standing” to challenge a search.  See, e.g., State v. Haworth, 106 
Idaho 405, 407 n.2 (1984). 
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C.  Mr. Pendleton Had Standing To Challenge The Search Because He Had A 
Subjective Expectation Of Privacy In The Place Searched That Society Is Willing 
To Recognize As Reasonable 
 
Mr. Pendleton asserts he had standing to challenge the search of the building 
because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place searched that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.  Contrary to the district court’s determination that 
Mr. Pendleton could not have standing unless he claimed the building was his place of 
residence (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, Ls.14-18), one may have standing to challenge 
the search of one’s workplace.  Mr. Pendleton had standing to challenge the search of 
the building because he had a subjective expectation of privacy in his workplace that 
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 
Under the first part of the inquiry into whether Mr. Pendleton had standing or a 
legitimate expectation of privacy, see Pruss, 145 Idaho at 626, Mr. Pendleton had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the building.  Mr. Pendleton worked at the building 
for the owner of the building, had access to the tools there, and had responsibility to 
secure the building.  (See Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, Ls.6-20, p.61, Ls.1-5.)  Thus, as he 
asserted, Mr. Pendleton expected privacy at the building, his workplace.  (See 
Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.59, Ls.2-18.) 
The second part of the inquiry is an issue of law:  “Is society willing to recognize 
[Mr. Pendleton’s] expectation of privacy as being reasonable?”  See Pruss, 145 Idaho at 
626.  This part of the inquiry examines “whether the government’s intrusion infringes 
upon the personal and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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As the Idaho Supreme Court explained in Pruss, “[a] structure need not be one’s 
‘home’ in order for the occupant to have a legitimate expectation of privacy there.”  Id. 
(quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990)).  “The Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places, and provides sanctuary for citizens wherever they have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy.”  Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
One may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s workplace.  Indeed, 
the United States Supreme Court has held that, “[w]ithin the workplace context, this 
Court has recognized that employees may have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
against intrusions by police.”  O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 716 (1987) (citing 
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968)).  “As with the expectation of privacy in one’s 
home, such an expectation in one’s place of work is ‘based upon societal expectations 
that have deep roots in the history of the Amendment.’”  Id. (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 n.8 (1984)).  The O’Connor Court defined the “workplace” as 
including “those areas and items that are related to work and are generally within the 
employer’s control.”  Id. at 715.  “These areas remain part of the workplace context 
even if the employee has placed personal items in them, such as a photograph placed 
in desk or a letter posted on an employee bulletin board.”  Id. at 716. 
In an earlier case, the United States Supreme Court held “[t]he Warrant Clause 
of the Fourth Amendment protects commercial buildings as well as private homes.  To 
hold otherwise would belie the origin of that Amendment, and the American colonial 
experience.”  Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 311 (1978).  The Marshall Court 
explained that the general warrant, which allowed colonial officers to search suspected 
places without evidence of a fact committed, “was a recurring point of contention in the 
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Colonies immediately preceding the Revolution.”  Id.  The Court further noted:  “The 
particular offensiveness it engendered was acutely felt by the merchants and 
businessmen whose premises and products were inspected for compliance with the 
several parliamentary revenue measures that most irritated the colonists.”  Id.  “‘[T]he 
Fourth Amendment’s commands grew in large measure out of the colonists’ experience 
with the writs of assistance . . . [that] granted sweeping power to customs officials and 
other agents of the King to search at large for smuggled goods.’”  Id. (quoting United 
States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 708 (1977)) (alterations in original). 
In the Mancusi case cited by the O’Connor Court, the United States Supreme 
Court held a union employee who shared an office with other union employees had a 
privacy interest in the office sufficient to challenge the warrantless search of the office.  
Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.  The Court in Mancusi observed that “if DeForte [the union 
employee] had occupied a ‘private’ office in the union headquarters, and union records 
had been seized from a desk or a filing cabinet in that office, he would have had 
standing.”  Id.  “In such a ‘private’ office, DeForte would have been entitled to expect 
that he would not be disturbed except by personal or business invitees, and that records 
would not be taken except with his permission or that of his union superiors.”  Id.  The 
Mancusi Court then explained, “[i]t seems to us that the situation was not fundamentally 
changed because DeForte shared an office with other union officers.”  Id.  “DeForte still 
could reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or business 
guests would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with their 
permission or that of union higher-ups.”  Id. 
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Thus, contrary to the district court’s determination (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.61, 
Ls.14-18), one may have standing to challenge a search of one’s workplace because 
one may have a reasonable expectation of privacy therein.  Here, Mr. Pendleton’s 
expectation of privacy in the building was one that society is willing to recognize as 
reasonable.  Much like the private office discussed in Mancusi, Mr. Pendleton could 
reasonably have expected that he would not be disturbed in the building, as his 
workplace, except by personal or business invitees.  See Mancusi, 392 U.S. at 369.  
Mr. Pendleton had responsibility to secure the building (see Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.54, 
Ls.18-19), and there was no evidence presented that the building was open to the 
public.  Thus, a reasonably respectful citizen would not make an uninvited entry into the 
building.  Cf. Pruss, 145 Idaho at 628 (“Police officers acting without a warrant are 
entitled to the same intrusion as a reasonably respectful citizen.  A reasonably 
respectful citizen would not make an uninvited entry into another’s tent pitched on public 
lands.” (citation omitted)).  Based upon societal expectations that have deep roots in the 
history of the Fourth Amendment, see O’Connor, 480 U.S. at 716, Mr. Pendleton had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the building as his workplace. 
Because Mr. Pendleton had a subjective expectation of privacy in the place 
searched that society is willing to recognize as reasonable, he had a legitimate 
expectation of privacy or standing to challenge the search of the building.  See Pruss, 
145 Idaho at 626.  The district court therefore erred when it determined Mr. Pendleton 
did not have standing to challenge the search. 
Because the district court erred, it did not reach the merits of Mr. Pendleton’s 
motion to suppress and consider whether the State met its burden of showing an 
 17 
exception to the warrant requirement applied to the search of the building.  (See 
Tr., Feb. 19, 2015, p.46, L.1 – p.62, L.21.)  Thus, Mr. Pendleton’s judgment of 
conviction and the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress should be 
vacated, and the case should be remanded to the district court.  Cf. State v. Pachosa, 
No. 42950, ___Idaho ___, ___ P.3d ___, 2016 WL 933158 (2016) (vacating an order 
granting a motion to suppress and remanding the case to the district court for it to 




 For the above reasons, Mr. Pendleton respectfully requests this Court vacate his 
judgment of conviction, vacate the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, 
and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 11th day of May, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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